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Cyprus Negotiations Thwarted by 
Issues on Security and Guarantees 
How Can the Peace Process Be Revived? 
Ioannis N. Grigoriadis 
The failure of the latest round of negotiations at Crans-Montana has disenchanted 
those who saw them as a historic opportunity for the resolution of the Cyprus problem. 
Issues regarding security and guarantees proved to be insurmountable obstacles to a 
solution. Although mutual recriminations, upcoming hydrocarbon drillings, and presi-
dential elections in Cyprus will not help restore the negotiations in the immediate 
future, there is no better alternative to the continuation of the UN-led negotiations 
process, with the aim of achieving a federal solution. 
 
Despite significant progress, the latest 
round of Cyprus conflict-resolution 
negotiations at Crans-Montana, Switzer-
land, has again failed to deliver a break-
through. The leaders of the two Cypriot 
communities and the foreign ministers of 
Cyprus’ three guarantor states – Greece, 
Turkey, and the United Kingdom – could 
not reach common ground, with security 
and guarantees being considered the 
most important obstacles. The moderate 
credentials of both leaders – the President 
of the Republic of Cyprus and Greek Cy-
priot leader, Nicos Anastasiades, and the 
President of the internationally unrecog-
nized “Turkish Republic of Northern 
Cyprus (TRNC)” and Turkish Cypriot leader, 
Mustafa Akıncı – had inspired the hopes 
of all Cypriots who desire an end to the 
60-year-long partition of the island. Never-
theless, both failed to meet expectations. 
Trust between the two leaders suffered 
a heavy blow in the Mont Pèlerin negotia-
tions of December 2016 and the Geneva 
Conference of January 2017 and never re-
covered. Although the two leaders should 
have acted together and represented the 
interests of the Cypriot people as a team – 
both against their respective communities 
and the guarantor states – they acted sepa-
rately and each began questioning the true 
intentions of the other. Incidents such as 
the February 2017 decision of the Cypriot 
Parliament to approve the commemoration 
in public schools of the 1950 Greek Cypriot 
referendum about union with Greece (enosis) 
led Mr. Akıncı to assume that Mr. Anasta-
siades was not truly committed to the peace 
process, and that he was more interested 
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in his expected candidacy for the February 
2018 presidential elections in the Republic 
of Cyprus. On his side, Mr. Anastasiades 
expected a more courageous stance from 
Mr. Akıncı when it came to spelling out 
the dissociation of Turkish Cypriot from 
Turkish interests on issues such as security 
and guarantees. This allowed Turkey to 
state its own views and face no significant 
pressure when it came to the question of 
compromise. Crucial time was wasted in 
the first months of 2017. Efforts by the UN 
Secretary-General Special Advisor Espen 
Barth Eide to bring the sides closer led to 
the reconvening of the Conference on Cy-
prus at Crans-Montana, but he could not 
secure a compromise agreement. A last-
ditch package-deal proposal put forward 
by Mr. Anastasiades on 5 July failed to 
change the course of events. 
UN Secretary-General António Guterres 
refused in his statement to identify one 
particular issue as the reason for the failure 
at Crans-Montana. Nonetheless, security 
and guarantees appeared to be the thorniest 
issues. The presence of Turkish troops and 
the future of the guarantee system were 
heavily debated. Turkey demanded the 
continuation of the Treaty of Guarantee 
and the permanent presence of Turkish 
troops. The Republic of Cyprus and Greece 
demanded the abolition of the Treaty of 
Guarantee and the full withdrawal of all 
troops. Then efforts were made to bridge 
the two opposing positions through a pro-
posal that allowed for the presence of a 
small number of Greek and Turkish forces 
as part of an international security force. 
Whether their departure from Cyprus 
would take place at a certain future date 
(sunset clause) or simply be reconsidered 
(review clause) at a certain future date were 
the subjects of the final negotiation, which 
did not bear fruit. Meanwhile, Turkish 
Cypriots appeared willing to return only 
part of the town of Morphou (Güzelyurt) 
to Greek Cypriot administration, whereas 
Greek Cypriots conceded to a single-ticket 
rotating presidency between Greek Cypriots 
and Turkish Cypriots. They also conceded to 
a more flexible attitude on the property 
issue, only as a part of their package-deal 
proposal and under the condition that 
Morphou would be returned, the guarantee 
regime would be abolished, and a “sunset 
clause” would be set for the presence of 
Turkish troops in Cyprus. 
What Next for Cyprus? 
The failure of the latest round of negotia-
tions is undoubtedly a big setback in efforts 
to reunify the island. It has disheartened 
peace activists and relieved hardliners on 
both sides of the “Green Line.” Many have 
argued that this was the last chance for 
a federal solution in Cyprus and that if 
Anastasiades and Akıncı could not reach 
a deal, nobody can. Others have pointed out 
that, although time was working against 
the viability of a federal solution in Cyprus, 
low points have been overcome in the re-
cent history of the Cyprus question and 
negotiations were resumed. In any case, any 
alternative scenario would probably gener-
ate more tension and acrimony. 
Potential Conflict Points Looming 
In the near future, the conditions for a 
potential resumption of the talks are 
unlikely to improve. The hydrocarbon 
drillings of the Total–ENI consortium in 
Plot No. 11 of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
of the Republic of Cyprus could harm 
relations between the parties. Turkey has 
disputed the right of the Republic of Cyprus 
to conduct such operations and has con-
ducted its own research on seismic activity 
in the region. The Republic of Cyprus has 
considered such operations to be its sover-
eign right and has been supported in this 
issue by the international community. A 
Turkish reaction to the operation, which 
began in July 2017, would further deterio-
rate the already tense climate. The launch-
ing of the campaign for the Cypriot presi-
dential elections in February 2018 is also 
likely to have a detrimental effect on the 
prospects for a resumption of negotiations. 
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The common understanding between the 
two biggest Greek Cypriot parties – the 
center-right Democratic Rally (DISY) and 
the left Progressive Party of Working People 
(AKEL) – that has been instrumental in 
keeping the negotiation process stable will 
inevitably dissipate, and mutual recrimina-
tions will abound. 
What about a New Negotiation 
Framework? 
Would this mean that there are no pros-
pects for restarting the peace process? On 
the one hand, the Republic of Cyprus and 
Greece have pledged for the continuation of 
the UN “good offices” mission in Cyprus. 
President Anastasiades stated that he would 
remain available to negotiate on the basis 
of his proposal. On the other hand, Turkey 
has declared its discontent with the current 
negotiations framework. President Recep 
Tayyip Erdoğan stated that the failure of 
the talks at Crans-Montana pointed at the 
impossibility of finding a solution within 
the set framework of the United Nations 
mission. In other words, seeking a confed-
eral solution, or even a negotiated parti-
tion, would be Turkey’s desirable outcome. 
The statements of the Turkish Cypriot 
leader, Mustafa Akıncı, also reflect dis-
illusionment – up to the point of disbelief – 
about the feasibility of achieving a federal 
solution in Cyprus. On his side, the UN 
Secretary-General linked the continuation 
of the UN mission to the will of the parties. 
For the convergences achieved in the recent 
negotiations not to be wasted and for the 
better planning of any upcoming confi-
dence-building measures, it would be neces-
sary that both sides request the continua-
tion of the UN mission. 
Could the new failure mean that Cyprus 
is heading toward a confederation, parti-
tion, or even annexation of the north to 
Turkey? Although repeated failures to 
achieve a breakthrough only reinforce the 
status quo and the long-standing de facto 
division of the island, this does not neces-
sarily mean that inertia can be easily over-
come and a new framework can be set. Any 
alternative solution will face fierce opposi-
tion from either of the two communities 
or the guarantor powers, and it would be 
even more difficult to sway public opinion, 
regardless of side, about the wisdom of that 
choice. The proposal to abandon the federal 
model and to work toward a negotiated 
partition with both states becoming mem-
bers of the European Union – a “velvet 
divorce” – has been presented as an alter-
native to a federal solution. Turkish Cy-
priots would gain their sovereignty and 
EU membership. What the Greek Cypriots 
would gain by supporting Turkish Cypriot 
sovereignty would be minor territorial 
gains and the prevention of a Turkish 
takeover of northern Cyprus. Nevertheless, 
this underestimates not only the unpopu-
larity of such an idea within Greek Cypriot 
public opinion, but also the very viability 
of the “TRNC.” Turkish Cypriots have not 
been able to develop their own state capaci-
ty and have remained dependent on the 
financial aid and security apparatus of 
Turkey. This also means that, even if the 
“TRNC” were internationally recognized, it 
would not meet the Copenhagen Criteria 
for EU membership. Cutting the umbilical 
cord connecting Turkish Cypriots to Turkey 
without the resolution of the Cyprus issue 
is a project more difficult than achieving a 
federal solution in Cyprus. In other words, 
Turkish Cypriot sovereignty is a goal that 
Turkish Cypriots alone could not achieve, 
and neither Turkey nor the Republic of 
Cyprus would be willing to endorse it, let 
alone fund it. Notwithstanding the poten-
tial veto of member states, the European 
Union would find it contradictory to its 
own record of reconciliation and integra-
tion to facilitate the partition of one of its 
smallest member states. The most likely 
scenario following protracted inertia would 
be the annexation of northern Cyprus to 
Turkey. 
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Turkey’s Influence on the Process 
Regardless of the responsibilities of both 
communities for the failure of peace 
negotiations in Cyprus, it should not be 
forgotten that Turkey remains the biggest 
veto player. The discussions about security 
and guarantees are a reminder of this. 
The main reason for Turkey’s shift from 
its traditional position in 2004 was a novel 
understanding of Turkey’s strategic inter-
ests in Cyprus. The Justice and Develop-
ment Party (AKP) government made it clear 
that Turkey’s interests on the island were 
limited to the protection of the legitimate 
interests of the Turkish Cypriots and did 
not expand to the protection of Turkey’s 
own security and strategic priorities. 
Thirteen years after the Annan Plan, the 
AKP government’s insistence on the per-
manent presence of Turkish troops and the 
continuation of the guarantees – despite 
efforts to address the security concerns of 
Turkish Cypriots through means acceptable 
to Greek Cypriots – resonates with the 
increasing identification of the AKP govern-
ment with mainstream Turkish views on 
the Cyprus question that were dominant 
between 1974 and 2002. If Turkey again 
considers Cyprus as its own strategic out-
post in the Eastern Mediterranean and 
wishes to perpetuate its presence at the 
expense of Turkish Cypriot interests, then 
the prospect of a solution would become 
even more distant. 
Confidence-building Measures and 
the Role of Cypriot Civil Society 
Considering the above, it would be a sur-
prise if a major political initiative were 
to be taken to conduct a new round of 
negotiations before the February 2018 
Cypriot presidential elections. In the mean-
time, Cypriot civil society is the most suit-
able forum, not only for promoting bi-
communal cooperation and dialogue but 
also for exerting pressure for the resump-
tion of the peace talks based on a federal 
model. Putting forward a set of confidence-
building measures that have been exhaust-
ingly discussed but not implemented over 
the last years – such as the opening of new 
checkpoints on the Green Line, the unifica-
tion of mobile telephony networks, the 
opening of the closed city of Varosha to its 
legal inhabitants and its reconstruction, 
and easing the embargo against Turkish 
Cypriots – could become important short-
term goals because they would make the 
benefits of cooperation clear and would 
fuel further cooperation and integration. 
Supporting existing bi-communal civil 
society activities and working toward the 
expansion of the number and scope of 
involved NGOs so that wider segments of 
both communities are involved is also of 
paramount significance. Opening the 
discussions about security to the citizens 
would also be of primary importance so 
that the real needs of Greek Cypriots and 
Turkish Cypriots can be identified. Escaping 
from zero-sum game approaches – where 
security for Turkish Cypriots meant in-
security for Greek Cypriots and vice versa – 
to solutions that improve security simulta-
neously for all Cypriots would be vital. 
Reaching an agreement on the bi-com-
munal distribution of prospective natural 
gas revenues in the event of a solution 
could also build bi-communal confidence 
and prevent the escalation of a new crisis. 
2017 has witnessed the emergence of an 
unprecedented bi-communal civil society 
mobilization. To defeat the status quo, 
Greek and Turkish Cypriot citizens need to 
take bold initiatives within the scope of 
their constitutional rights. If the political 
leadership hesitates to lead, a critical mass 
of Cypriot federalists could revitalize the 
Cypriot peace project. 
© Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik, 2017 
All rights reserved 
These Comments reflect  
the author’s views. 
SWP 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik 
German Institute for 




Telephone +49 30 880 07-0 
Fax +49 30 880 07-100 
www.swp-berlin.org 
swp@swp-berlin.org 
ISSN 1861-1761 
 
